According to the expressivist argument the choice to use biotechnologies to prevent the birth of individuals with specific disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with this disability. The argument has stirred a lively debate and has recently received renewed attention. This article starts with presenting the expressivist argument and its core elements. It then goes on to present and examine the counter-arguments before it addresses some aspects that have gained surprisingly little attention. The analysis demonstrates that the expressivist argument has a wide range of underpinnings and that counter-arguments tend to focus on only a few of these. It also reveals an important aspect that appears to have been ignored, i.e., that people do not select foetuses based on chromosomes or other biological traits, but based on characteristics of living persons with specific disabilities. This makes it more difficult to undermine the claim that negative selection of foetuses expresses a disvaluing of persons with such disabilities. It leaves the expressivist argument with a strong bite still.
| INTRODUCTION
However, the 'expressivist objection' has been met with a series of counter-arguments, also from within the disability movement. This has made the argument somewhat unfashionable in the ethics literature.
Nonetheless, it has received some renewed attention recently 3 and deserves closer scrutiny.
In this article I will shortly recap the expressivist argument (EA) and the counterarguments before investigating some of the aspects that have not been addressed in the literature. The analysis reveals that the expressivist argument expresses many moral concerns, that the counter-arguments only address some elements of the argument, and that opponents of the expressivist argument still have some work to do in order to undermine its relevance in debates on selectioninstigating reproductive biotechnologies. 1 I will use the term 'expressivist argument' (EA) instead of 'expressivist objection,' 'expressivist view ', 4 or 'expressive force' 5 in order to avoid contributing to the unfruitful polarization between promoting and objecting to new technologies, or between 'bioconservatives' and 'bioprogressives' or 'transhumanists'. When striving for good assessments of biotechnology and finding the best ways to develop and implement such technology, we need to assess and analyze arguments on their own rights -independent of whether they are promoting or opposing implementation of a given technology.
| EA AND I T S EL EME N TS
EA is frequently presented as follows: the choice to use biotechnologies to prevent the birth of individuals with specific disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with this disability. 6 A much quoted version of the argument goes like this: 'tests to select against disabling traits express a hurtful attitude about and send a hurtful message to people who have those same traits '. 7 There are many underpinnings of EA, which are summarized in Table 1 . The table is meant to give an overview over the many and various elements 8 of the argument. All the elements are rarely present at the same time, but more frequently one or more elements are at the basis of various discussions on new reproductive technologies.
Let us briefly look closer some of these elements before we look at some of their counter-arguments.
One core element of EA is a critique of an implicit reduction of individuals' worth to a specific disease trait. To use a biotechnology to remove an embryo or fetus with a particular genetic trait implies that the value of that future child can be judged on a single characteristic or a (disease) trait. 9 As elaborated by Asch: 'As with discrimination more generally, with prenatal diagnosis a single trait stands in for the whole, the trait obliterates the whole. With both discrimination and prenatal diagnosis, nobody finds out about the rest. The tests send the message that there's no need to find out about the rest.' 10 This reduction of a person to a trait, also called the synecdoche argument, has been identified in everyday language about persons (or fetuses) being 'diabetic,' 'hemophiliac,' 'Downs'' etc. 11 Accordingly, expressing a devaluation is not wrong (primarily) because the harm it causes (to third persons), but because it 'manifests a willingness to quickly infer a global evaluation of a person on the basis of a single fact' 12 as the disabling trait comes to 'trump' all other traits.
13
Another crucial element of EA is that the disability is considered to be an essential part of the identity of persons with the disability. 14 Disabling traits are (at least partly) identity constitutive. Negative actions or attitudes against this disability thereby are considered to be devaluations of the identity of persons with this disability. Edwards gives a clarifying outline of the identity aspect:
(a) Reduction in the incidence of condition C is viewed as morally desirable.
(b) C is (at least partly) identity constituting for persons of type P.
(c) Reduction of C necessarily entails the reduction of persons of type P.
(d) Reduction in the numbers of persons of type P is considered morally desirable.
(e) This is harmful to existing (and future) P-type people.
(f) This is therefore morally wrong.
15
EA also has empirical elements in terms of references to empirical stud- This touches on the point that there is a discrepancy between persons with experiential knowledge of the conditions that the technologies are testing for and those without (including genetic councillors) 22 Ignoring the experiences and perspectives of those affected sends a negative signal, and can be conceived of as a kind of epistemic injustice. Hence, some of the empirical elements have a double touch: first they argue that people with disabilities experience negative attitudes or discrimination, and second, they reveal that these experiences are ignored.
23
Yet another element of EA (which has been heavily criticized) is that negative selection of embryos or foetuses due to specific traits is inconsistent with the support of persons with such traits. This is related to the tension between prevention and protection in the general disability debate 24 and to the concern that viewing (genetic) disability as a reproductive choice 'may reduce our communal commitment to people with genetic disabilities.' 25 The point that is being made is that it is The value of individuals is reduced to one specific characteristic or (disease) trait, i.e., the disabling trait comes to 'trump' all other traits
Core element Identity
The disability is considered to be an essential part of the identity of persons with the disability (which is why they can feel affected)
Empirical aspect Empirical fact
People with disabilities and their relatives feel disvalued by the implementation and use of technologies that facilitate the termination of pregnancies with fetuses that have biological characteristics that are associated with this specific disability.
Empirical aspect Epistemic injustice
Those affected by or having experience with the disability have less voice in assessing the negative value of a condition or disability.
Logical aspect Inconsistency
It is inconsistent to support the rights of people with specific disabilities and at the same time to prevent people to be born with that disability Please note that this is not a review of the empirical literature on how people with disabilities experience (reproductive) biotechnology that aims at avoiding persons with this disability to be born. I am not investigating the soundness of the argument, only presenting it. Moreover, there may be ethical and practical reasons why there are so few studies on how people with disabilities experience new technologies that can restrict the existence of future persons with such disabilities. However, it may also be due to devaluation. inconsistent to support the rights of people with specific disabilities and at the same time to prevent people from being born with those disabilities. Although this appears be the element of EA that is most frequently rejected, it is rarely explicitly encountered in the literature.
Additionally, EA also has some consequentialist elements.
Selection-promoting reproductive technologies draw attention to prejudicial language 26 and can potentially be harmful to persons who identify with (the) disability 27 through their emotional and existential impact. Screening tests directed at avoiding conditions which persons have (and identify with) stirs existential reflections on whether one would have existed, had the technology been available to one's parents: 'if they had this technology, I would not have existed.' The consequentialist version of the argument reasons from the harm that various types of (negative embryo or foetus) selection cause, either as mental distress or as being 'objectively harmful, regardless of whether one takes it to heart, or is even aware of it, for example because being outwardly valued by others is a component of the good life'.
28
Various versions of EA also refer to human rights and principles, such as equity, and basic values, such as 'openness to the unbidden'.
29
To search for and abort foetuses with specific conditions or traits breaches with the basic conception that all human beings have 'equal worth independent of health, condition, disease or abilities' in the same manner that to abort foetuses on basis of a specific sex breaches with the basic principle of equality.
30
In addition to the mentioned elements, Søren Holm makes some useful distinctions when he points out that there are at least three versions of EA 31 depending on who is expressing something and what is expressed. With regard to who is expressing, there is a difference between whether a given politically backed social practice expresses something (e.g., an attitude undermining equity) and whether choices made by individual agents within the context of that practice express something. Correspondingly, there is a difference with regard to what is expressed. There is a difference between whether the practice is claimed to express a discriminatory or just a negative attitude towards (a particular) disability. Holm argues that it is more plausible that negative selection expresses a negative attitude than a discriminatory attitude.
Underscoring the importance of personal identity, he describes this neg- However interesting, all phrasings of EA and various types of implicit or second order arguments will not be discussed in this article. Table 1 provides a summary of EA and its most prominent elements.
| COUNT ERARG UMENTS
After this brief overview of EA, let me turn to the most frequently presented counter-arguments. I will briefly present each counterargument, illustrate how it addresses the various elements of EA (in Table 1 ), and indicate some shortcomings of the counter-arguments.
The goal is to highlight overlooked aspects and potential fields of improvement in the argumentation on reproductive technologies.
| Confusing identity
One counter-argument is directed at the identity element of EA. Taylor, C. (1989) . Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity (pp. 14-15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
59
Some would also argue that other important aspects have been ignored as well, e.g., Axel Honneth's conception of recognition or Nussbaum's conception of the relationship between compassion and social institutions. this counterargument does not seem to undermine EA in terms of disvaluing persons with disabilities.
| Choice is the issue, not expression
Yet another counter-argument is based on showing that the motives of persons selecting (away) embryos or foetuses are not to express negative attitudes or devaluation, but choosing what they consider to be best for them. Or as clearly expressed by Julian Savluescu: 'Reproduction should be about having children who have the best prospects'.
63
As Harris points out: 'It might be suggested that the mere existence of disabled people is good for society and that we will benefit from they being around us. Of course we do! This is not an issue. What is fundamental is that, once we have the choice as to create people with disability or not (. . .), we have to decide whether we are entitled to impose disability on some in order to reap the benefit of their presence among us'.
64
The gist of this counterargument is that (reproductive) choice This argument presupposes that the regulation of negative selection is coercion. Gyngell and Douglas do acknowledge, however, that anti-hate speech legislation outlaws speech acts that promote hatred based on race, religion or ethnicity, but find that 'it seems at the very least doubtful whether the harm-based variant of EA will meet the liberal eugenic challenge'. 70 They think that negative selection with various reproductive technologies may cause harm to future generations by making future generations more susceptible to future catastrophes. 71 However, in this they refer to the diversity argument, and not to EA.
In any case, for these counter-arguments to have any traction we need better evidence on the harm of selective social practices. To argue that the harm from disvaluing weighs less than breaching with values of liberal eugenics framework you need to have evidence of the harm from disvaluation. However, so far no such evidence is available. 
| No empirical evidence
Accordingly, one counterargument to EA is that there is little evidence that selection is harmful or promotes attitudes that are harmful to persons with disabilities. 73 Hence, harm cannot be taken into account.
However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence (of harm). As already pointed out, there are some studies demonstrating a negative effect of (negative) selection on persons with the disabilities that are selected for 74 and it has been demonstrated that people want testing 63 even though they think it may be discriminatory. 75 One may of course argue that the empirical evidence is of poor quality and that more knowledge is needed before the harm-argument has any traction. This lack of knowledge, however, undermines not only the empirical expressivist argument but also its counterargument.
| What the counterarguments show
What this short review of the counterarguments reveals is a) that they are not fully compelling (to all) and b) that they address only some of the aspects of EA. In particular they are directed at the inconsistency aspect, which does not seem to be a core element of EA.
Fierce opponents of EA may of course argue that I haven't paid enough attention to the counterarguments, or that my concerns about their range are irrelevant. Many may also counter my concerns with supplementary premises supporting the counterarguments or new arguments undermining EA. That is fine. My point has not been to claim that the counterarguments are totally wrong, but only to indicate that they are not overly convincing to guide regulation and practice.
My very coarse analysis indicates that there is still work to be done in order to make the (counter)arguments convincing. Moreover, the counterarguments should address core elements of EA, and not mere remote aspects (and strawmen).
In addition to the counter-arguments' lack of marksmanship and persuasive power, there are also aspects of EA that have appear to have been ignored by those who eager to dismiss EA.
| O VE R LOO K E D A S P E C T S OF E A
One of the points that the debates on EA appear to have overlooked is a basic concern driving part of the argument, i.e., that social practices frame and form our social norms and values and that the sum of individual legitimate actions may lead to a society we do not want. Its proponents are not convinced by theoretical arguments that eliminating disability and valuing and supporting disabled persons are completely independent. EA proponents seem to fear that the first involves underlying negative norms and values that may have negative consequences independent of the latter.
Moreover, EA tries to address the tension between individual liberty and plurality. One of the reasons why these perspectives are not easy to reconcile may be because they are based on different conceptions of the good. Those who find EA irrelevant and flawed tend to equal the good with progress and enhancement/improvement while those who think the argument to be sound, have other, and usually much broader, conceptions of the good, e.g. as much more than mere satisfaction of preferences. Hence, there is a (irreconcilable) conflict of goals.
Another overlooked aspect is what is evaluated, i.e., what the expression is about. In the various forms of (negative) selection the assessment of foetuses apparently is made on basis of biomolecular characteristics, e.g., three chromosomes in chromosome pair 21. The point is that we determine to select for certain genetic characteristics in embryos and foetuses because these are associated with characteristics which are (dis)valued. The reason that many find sex selection abhorrent is not that they think that X chromosomes are as beautiful and valuable as Y chromosomes. It is because they think that females are as valuable as males, and that any discrimination is unwarranted. If it were the abilities of the chromosomes, we would be justified in preferring Xchromosomes, as they contain 30 times as many (presumably functionally beneficial) genes as Y-chromosomes. Hence, on a chromosomal level it could make sense to select X and discard Y chromosomes. But we don't, because it is not the chromosomes that matter to us. What matters is the characteristics associated with these chromosomes.
The core of the what may be called the disvaluing transfer (aspect of the expressivist) argument goes like this:
I. The condition C is viewed as undesirable.
II. C is (at least partly) identity constituting for persons of type P.
III. It is possible to reduce the incidence of C by assessing certain markers M of condition C.
IV. The markers M are not experienced, but only (dis)valued as markers of C.
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It may also be argued that we have no knowledge of what is expressed beyond some clues that persons with disability may feel that they are 'a second-class specimen', 'second-class human beings', and 'defectives'; Kass, op. cit. note 11. For some people this point is at the core of the justification for their decision. They do not kill a person, they terminate a pregnancy.
V. The assessment of the value of M is based on characteristics of persons with C. VI. Disvaluing M based on characteristics of persons with C can be conceived of as a disvalue of persons of type P.
VII. Reducing the incidence of condition C (being identity constituting for persons of type P) based on markers M being disvalued due to characteristics of P (or individuals with C) may be conceived of a disvalue of persons with P.
Whether this, then, is a knock down argument against introducing technologies for reducing the incidence of C is not the core issue here.
I am not claiming that persons have been terminating pregnancies based on the characteristics of genes or chromosomes either. The point is that there are important aspects of EA that have been ignored and that may undermine some of the counterarguments. It is important to underscore that in pointing to this apparently ignored aspect of EA, I do not claim that it bolsters the argument or that it is a knock down argument against the counterarguments. I only claim that it is an argument that needs to be taken into account and that it indicates that EA warrants some more attention.
| DISCUSSION
In this article I have presented EA and some of its core elements/aspects. There is of course a wide range of aspects of the debate that have not been discussed in this article. One of them is the conceptual status of disability, e.g., whether disability is a social or a natural phenomenon or whether people with disabilities are worse off. 82 No doubt such debates are relevant to the expressivist argument, but addressing them here would be beyond the scope of this article.
Also, in discussing harms from (negative) selection, there are other harms than discussed here, e.g., future harms to future people.
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Although this is highly relevant when discussing various types of embryo selection technologies, it is not specific for the expressivist argument.
As pointed out in Table 1 , the elements of the arguments could be interpreted as premises for the expressivist argument. They could also be seen as arguments in their own right, related or affiliated to the expressivist argument. Accordingly, one may very well argue that there is not one expressivist argument with many ele- The expressivist argument also has implications for the enhancement debate as selecting for certain valued character traits may represent a disvalue of the lack of such traits -and consequently express a disvalue of persons with the lack of these traits. Selecting for intelligence may make less intelligent people feel disvalued. Again, the problem may not be limited to the harm caused to unintelligent persons (as we will die out), but the norms and values we formed by the selection.
Hence, the harm of importance in the expressivist argument may not be the harm to individuals or groups with a certain characteristic or trait, but the harm to us as a society. Accordingly, the expression of importance in the expressivist argument may not only be what (vulnerable) groups perceive, but as much the social norms and values expressed by our social institutions and practices. A good society is not necessarily a society where there are no dangers, where everybody is born according to given norms of beauty or intelligence.
| CONCLUSION
The expressivist argument is discussed in many ways due to its diverse core elements. Despite many well-articulated counterarguments several shortcomings have been revealed, e.g., strawmen and unwarranted premises. Moreover, the counterarguments do not address all core ele- 
